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R. St. J. Macdonald*

International Treaty Law
And The Domestic Law
Of Canada

In this paper I propose to explore the relationship between treaty law
and domestic law in Canada. I will start with the familiar theory of
the relationship between treaties and domestic law in England and in
Canada and then move to less familiar areas of Canadian practice.
An attempt will be made to investigate the rather murky area
surrounding interdepartmental arrangements between Canada and
sovereign states which are less than treaties but which do affect
domestic law. I will attempt to raise, if not to answer, preliminary
questions about the effectiveness of these procedures, the
safeguards inherent in them, and their acceptability to the
enlightened electorate of twentieth century Canada. These questions
will lead to a few conclusions and, if necessary, some
recommendations.
I.

ConventionalLaw andMunicipalLaw: The Theory

1. In England
The law in England is and has been for some time very clear that the
power to make and ratify treaties lies with the Crown exclusively. 1
However, treaties so made and ratified cannot impose rights and
duties on anyone in England except the Crown itself. If the ability to
enjoy those rights and fulfill those duties lies within the royal
prerogative that is the end of the matter; nothing further is required
to implement the treaty. If, on the other hand, the fulfillment of the
treaty requires actions outside the royal prerogative, then
Parliamentary action is necessary to implement the treaty. To permit
the Crown to exceed its powers in order to fulfill an obligation it has
itself contracted would be to alter the basic constitutional law of
England; that is an action indisputably beyond the power of the
Crown acting alone.
It is in this light that Lord Atkin's dictum in the Labour
Conventions Case should be read: "Within the British Empire there
*Ronald St. John Macdonald, Q.C., Dean of the Faculty of Law,
Dalhousie University.
1. Lord McNair, The Law of Treaties (1961), 78; 1 Blackstone's Corn. (14th Ed.)
256; Halsbury (3rd Ed.) Vol. 7, 287.
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is a well-established rule that the making of a Treaty is an executive
act, while the performance of its obligations, if they entail alteration
of the existing domestic law, requires legislative action". 2 If it lies
within the crown prerogative to make the requisite alterations in
domestic law, no legislation is required; but if, as is generally the
case, the required alterations in domestic law are beyond the crown
prerogative, then legislation will be necessary.
Viewed in this way, the rule admits of no exceptions; there are
simply situations where the royal prerogative suffices and situations
where it does not; and McNair's famous exceptions to the rule that
legislation is required become simple examples of the former
situation. Thus, the Crown is acting within its prerogative when it
seeks to enforce treaties it has ratified on rules for the conduct of
war. This explains Porter v. Freudenberg, where it was held that
the Hague Convention of 1907, which had not been implemented by
legislation, could alter the common law rule that an enemy alien has
no right to sue in English courts during hostilities. 3 Obviously, if
Parliament has legislated on matters relating to the conduct of war,
the Crown will be unable to modify the legislation. 4 Thus those parts
of the Geneva Convention relating to prisoners of war which are
implemented in the Geneva Conventions Act of 1957 are inviolable.
By the same theory, F. A. Mann argues that the other provisions of
the 1949 convention may also be in force in England. 5
It would seem that the Crown has the power to cede its territory
and that, although parliamentary approval has invariably been
obtained, the Crown could have granted independence to its former
colonies on its own. This power does not extend to territory within
England nor does it extend to the property of English nationals. In a
number of treaties, the Crown has purported to cede property rights
located in a foreign country. These treaties were made after the
Second World War with Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Poland,
Bulgaria and Hungary; and the British Government declared "on
their own behalf and on behalf of British nationals" that certain
sums would be accepted "in full satisfactions and final discharge of
2. Attorney-GeneralforCanadav. Attorney-GeneralforOntario,

[1937] A.C.326, 247 (P.C.).
3. Porter v. Freudenberg, [1915] 1 K.B. 857 (C.A.).

4. For example, the Crown's power to take land in wartime: see
Attorney-General v. DeKeyser's Royal Hotel, [ 1920] A.C. 508 (H.L.).

5. F. A. Mann, "The Enforcement of Treaties by English Courts" (1958), 44 The
Grotius Society, 29, 39.
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all liability to British nationals". 6 It is submitted that if these
provisions were sought to be enforced in English courts, they would
fail. This area of the Crown Prerogative has given rise to what can
only be described as a misinterpretation by Lord Summer in The
Blonde, where he said: "There can be no doubt that Germany was
competent, on behalf of those nationals who were German subjects
within the operation of the Treaty, to make cessions which would
bind them and effect a transfer of their rights of property as if the
cession had been made personally by the owner concerned". 7 This
view, which has been suggested in other Prize Court decisions,
must be restricted to questions arising between nations and not
between individuals. The Crown may also implement treaties of
peace designed to end a war so long as these treaties impose no
financial burden on the country. This power has created little
controversy in England, although, as we shall see, there have been
difficulties in Canada.
The common law rules on diplomatic and sovereign immunities
provide an excellent opportunity to observe what the Crown can and
cannot do. The Crown cannot create new immunities nor can it
create new classes of persons entitled to these immunities; these
actions require legislation. The Crown can, however, restrict the
immunities given and it can determine who is and who is not a
member of existing classes of persons who are entitled to those
immunities; these actions are within its prerogative.
The apparently opposing cases of The Parlement Beige and
Engelke v. Musmann are illustrative of the Crown's power to
determine membership in classes but not to create new classes. In
the former case, the Crown opposed a motion for the arrest of a
Belgian mailship on the ground that the Crown had signed a postal
convention (not implemented by legislation) to the effect that
Belgian mailboats should be ". . .treated (in British ports) as
vessels of war and be there entitled to all honours and privileges
which the interests and importance of the service. . .demand".8 Sir

6. Art. 2 of the Agreement with Yugoslavia (Dec. 3, 1948) CMD. 7600; Art. III of
the Agreement with Czechoslovakia (Sept. 28, 1949) CMD. 7797; Art. 5 of the
Agreement with Hungary (June 27, 1956) CMD. 9820; Art. 5 of the Agreement

with Bulgaria (Sept. 23, 1955) CMD. 9625; and Art. 5 of the Agreement with
Poland (Nov. 11, 1954) CMD. 9343.

7. The Blonde, [1922] 1 A.C. 313.
8. The Parlement Beige, (1879), 4 P.D. 129, 149 and Engelke v. Musmann,
[1928] A.C. 433 (H.L.).
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Robert Phillimore held that the Crown did not have the power to, in
effect, create immunities where none had heretofore existed. "If the
Crown without the authority of Parliament, may by process of
diplomacy, shelter a foreigner from one of Her Majesty's subjects
who has suffered injury at his hands, I do not see why it might not
also give a like privilege of immunity to a number of foreign
merchant vessels or to a number of foreign individuals. The law of
this country has indeed incorporated those portions of international
law which give immunity and privileges to foreign ships of war and
foreign ambassadors; but I do not think that it has therefore given
the crown authority to clothe with this immunity foreign vessels,
which are really not vessels of war, or foreign persons, who are not
really ambassadors". 9 The Crown will not "clothe" non-members
of the class with immunities belonging to that class.
In Engelke, the question was the status of a German cipher clerk,
not the immunities to which he was entitled. The House of Lords
accepted the Crown's statement, that it considered Engelke to be a
member of a class to which immunities normally attach, as
conclusive of that aspect of the case. Their lordships then dealt with
the common law question of whether the immunities would attach in
this case and what effect they might have. The Crown was thus
permitted to define the membershil of the class. 1 0 That the Crown
may restrict the immunities granted is clear from Fenton Textile v.
Krassin, where the official agents of the as-yet-unrecognized
government of Soviet Russia were put in the class of diplomats for
purposes of exemption from taxation, arrest and search. 11 The
courts upheld this restriction of immunity on the principle that it
represented a waiver of a foreign state's rights which the Crown
could accept within its prerogative.
Finally, the Crown may, by certain actions, such as a declaration
of war, bring into operation a different set of common law rules.
Although this action has the effect of changing the law under which
the country is governed, it is not an excess of the Crown's powers
because the common law itself has provided for alternate sets of
rules to govern in any event.
9. Ibid., 154.
10. Cf. Lord Buckmaster in Engelke v. Musmass, [1928] A.C. 433, 466 (H.L.).
This case followed the ruling in Duff Development Co. Ltd. v. Government of
Kelantan, [1923] A.C. 395 (H.L.).
11. Fenton Textile v. Krassin (1921), T.L.R. 259, (C.A.). This case is also
support for the principle in the Engelke case.
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A treaty may be implemented by legislation in one of three ways:
first, Parliament may translate the treaty into a number of statutes or
amendments to existing statutes; second, it may enact a general law
which uses the key terms of the treaty and is clearly designed to
implement the treaty; finally, it may directly enact the treaty, with
an appropriate preamble, into English law.
The latter two methods may give cause to the courts to go to the
treaty itself and interpret it as an aid in the enforcement of the
statute. In Parke-Davis & Co. v. Comptroller-Generalof Patents,
Designs & Trade Marks and Another, the government was
defending its decisions on the ground that by the Patents Act, 1949
it could make "no order. . .at variance with any treaty". 12 To
determine the question, the court felt obliged to interpret the
International Convention for Protection of Industrial Property,
1934. And, in Philippson et al v. Imperial Airways Ltd., the
question arose in the interpretation of a contract as to whether the
carriage in question was international. The conditions of carriage
were based on the Warsaw Convention and the court looked to that
convention to make its decision.' 3 Of course, this case concerned a
private contract and it was not suggested that the Warsaw
Convention was the law of the land. Perhaps the classic example of
the English courts' willingness to go to the treaty itself is to be
found in Stoeck v. Public Trustee, where the question was whether
or not Stoeck was an alien within the meaning of the Treaty of Paris
Order, 1919. The order simply stated that certain parts of the Treaty
of Paris were to have full force and effect. In examining the entire
treaty with a view to determining the meaning of the relevant
provisions, Russell J. said: "I apprehend it is the right of a litigant
to assert before the courts of this country, and the duty of those
courts to adjudicate upon, claims founded upon a consideration of
the municipal law of this country, and not the less so because the
law involved has been derived from and has been enacted for the
purpose of giving effect to, certain provisions of a document of an
international character". 14
The rule in English law, then, is clear that, apart from certain
situations involving interpretation, a treaty which requires action
outside the Crown's prerogative cannot be enforced without
12. Parke Davis & Co. v. Comptroller-Generalof Patents, Designs and Trade
Marks, [1954] A.C. 321 (H.L.).
13. Philippson et al. v. ImperialAirways Ltd., [1939] A.C. 332 (H.L.).
14. Stoeck v. Public Trustee, [192112 Ch. 67 (Ch. D.).
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legislation. The constitutional theory behind this rule appears to be
soundly based on the division of powers between the Crown and
Parliament, but the rule itself leaves unanswered some questions as
to the status of a ratified treaty requiring but not having implementing
legislation. It might well be argued that, being solemn declarations
of the Crown's policy and being binding upon England in the
international community, these treaties ought to have some effect.
This argument will be explored more fully after we have examined
the Canadian cases.
2.

In Canada

Canadian courts have adopted substantially the same approach to
conventional internation law as have the English courts. Indeed, the
principle quoted from the Labour Conventions Case as defining
English law arose from an appeal to the Privy Council from a
Supreme Court of Canada decision and is, to a certain extent,
binding on Canadian courts. The principle had, in any case, been
affirmed by the Supreme Court some five years earlier in the Arrow
River case where the court held that "the Crown cannot alter the
existing law by entering into a contract with a foreign power". 15
The Arrow River case is illustrative of another aspect of the
attitude of Canadian courts to treaties. The case arose when Ontario
passed a statute which imposed to toll on lumber passing along
certain rivers including the Pigeon River. Since the Pigeon River
was an international boundary river, this toll would have violated
the unimplemented Ashburton Treaty of 1842. The Court of Appeal
of Ontario and the Supreme Court of Canada (3 - 2), while
recognizing that the treaty, having no implementing legislation,
could be overridden by a statute, were able to interpret the statute in
such a way as to avoid conflict with the treaty. Riddell J.put the
matter this way: "The real argument is that the treaty was made
with Her Majesty and is binding in honour upon Her Majesty's
successor, His present Majesty, as it was upon His predecessor.
Consequently, the Sovereign will not consider enacting anything
that will conflict with His plain duty, unless the language employed
in the statute is perfectly clear and explicit, admitting of no other
interpretation. . . .the King cannot be thought of as violating His
agreement with the other contracting power; and if the Ontario
15. Re Arrow River and TributariesSlide and Boom Co., [1932] 2 D.L.R. 250,
260 (S.C.C.).
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legislation can fairly be read in such a way as to reject any
imputation of breaking faith, it must be so read.' 16 Thus the
Ontario statute was read in such a way as to avoid violating the
Ashburton Treaty. We shall return to this point presently.
Although there have been few cases on the point in Canada, it is
submitted that the English rule that the Crown can enforce a treaty
without legislation so long as the actions required lie within its
prerogative applies in Canada as well. In Francis v. The Queen,
Rand J. of the Supreme Court of Canada gave support to this branch
of the rule when he said that: "Speaking generally, provisions that
give recognition to incidents of sovereignty or deal with matters in
exclusively sovereign aspects, do not require legislative confirmation. For example, the recognition of independence, the establishment of boundaries and, in a treaty of peace, the transfer of
sovereignty over property, are deemed executed and the treaty
becomes the muniment or evidence of the political or proprietary
title. Except as to diplomatic status and certain immunities and to
belligerent rights, treaty provisions affecting matters within the
scope of municipal law, that is, which purport to change existing
law or restrict the future action of the legislature, including, under
our Constitution, the participation of the Crown, and in the absence
of a constitutional provision declaring the treaty itself to be the law
of the state, as in the United States, must be supplemented by
statutory action. ' "' 7 It is submitted that this statement accurately
reflects the rule in Canada with the caveat that one must read "the
transfer of sovereignity over property" as restricted to the transfer
of property to which Canada itself has title. A peace treaty could not
transfer private property without legislation.
As a result of three obiter dicta, there has been some confusion
about the status of treaties of peace in Canada. In Secretary of State
of Canada v. Alien PropertyCustodian of the United States, Duff J.
of the Supreme Court of Canada was dealing with the validity of the
Treaty of Peace (Germany) Order of 1920.18 The Order, passed
pursuant to the Treaties of Peace Act, was, of course, valid, but
Duff J. added that "the treaty, it is to be observed, being a Treaty of

16. Re Arrow River and TributariesSlide and Boom Co., [1931] 2 D.L.R. 216,
217 (Ont. C.A.).
17. Francis v. The Queen (1956), 3 D.L.R. (2d) 641,647 (S.C.C.).
18. Secretary of State of Canadav. Alien Property Custodianof the United States,
[1931] 1 D.L.R. 890 (S.C.C.).
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Peace, had the effect of law quite independently of legislation" .19
In a subsequent case on the same point, Ritchter v. The King,
Angers J. said that "in passing I will note that an Act was not
necessary to bring into force the Treaty of Peace between the Allied
and the Assocaited Powers and Germany in question in this case; a
treaty of peace is law in itself, independently of any legislation on
the subject". 20 He then cited the Alien Property case, supra, as
authority. One year later, Thorson J. of the Exchequer Court was
seized with the same question and, after quoting Duff J.'s dictum
said: "With the utmost respect, I venture the opinion that there is no
authority for this statement and that it cannot be accepted without
important qualifications. While a Treaty of Peace can be made only
by the Crown, it still remains an Act of the Crown. While it is
binding on the subjects of the Crown without legislation in the sense
that it terminates the war, it has never, so far as I have been able to
ascertain, been decided or admitted that the Crown could by its own
act in agreeing to the terms of a treaty alter the law of the land or
affect the private rights of individuals." ' 2 1 It is respectfully
submitted that this last dictum is the correct statement of the law and
that the two previous comments must be read subject to its
qualifications.
The situation in Canada on the enforcement of treaties, while
similar to that in England, is complicated by the federal nature of the
Canadian constitution. The difficulties created by the Labour
Conventions Case22 and other decisions have been discussed
elsewhere. 2 3 It is sufficient to quote Lord Atkin in the Labour
Conventions Case: "But in a state where the Legislature does not
possess absolute authority, in a federal state where legislative
authority is limited by a constitutional document, or is divided up
between different Legislatures in accordance with the classes of
subject-matter submitted for legislation, the problem is complex.
The obligations imposed by treaty may have to be performed, if at
all, by several Legislatures; and the Executive have the task of
19.1bid., 902.
20. Ritcher v. The King, [1943] 3 D.L.R. 540, 545 (Ex.).
21. Bitter v. Secretary of State ofCanada, [1944] 3 D.L.R. 482,497-98 (S.C.C.).
22. Sub nom. Attorney-General for Canada v. Attorney-General for Ontario,

[1937] A.C. 326 (P.C.).
23. Hon. I. C. Rand, "Some Aspects of Canadian Constitutionalism" (1960), 38
Can. Bar Rev. 135; Rt Hon. Lord Wright, "Rt. Hon. Sir Lyman Poore Duff,
G.C.M.G.. 1865-1955" (1955),33CanBarRev. 1123.
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obtaining the legislative assent not of one Parliament to whom they
may be responsible, but possibly of several Parliaments to whom
they stand in no direct relation. The question is not how is the
obligation formed, that is the function of the executive, but how it is
to be performed, and that depends upon the authority of the
24
competent Legislature or Legislatures.',
The theory behind this proposition is that when Canada was
created as a federal state within the British Empire, certain powers
were conferred exclusively on the provincial authorities. As time
passed and Canada acceded to the status of an independent and fully
sovereign nation, the federal executive acquired new powers to
discharge this new role. But, according to the theory, nothing in this
transition affected the distribution of legislative powers between the
dominion and the provinces. Hence, although the federal executive
might bind Canada internationally, it might or might not be able to
fulfill that commitment depending upon the nature of the subject
matter of the international agreement. The concern underlying this
theory is that provincial autonomy is threatened whenever the
central government is permitted to legislate in areas that are
exclusively provincial even if the purpose is to fulfill an
international obligation. Thus, after the Labour Conventions Case,
Canada was anable to live up to the agreement it signed and the
federal authorities were forced to begin negotiations which, as we
shall see, are still continuing with the provinces in an effort to
induce them to implement the terms of the agreement.
This approach is consistent with strict federal theory but it fails to
take into account the sweeping changes that have occurred in regard
to Canada's status as an international person. When the British
North America Act was drafted in 1867, it was thought that
Canada's international obligations would arise only through
membership in the British Empire. Section 132 of the Act provided
the federal authorities with ample power to implement any treaty
obligations so acquired; in other words, the Fathers of Confederation intended the central government to be able to discharge all of
Canada's foreseeable international responsibilities.
As Canada began to make treaties in her own right and not as part
of the Empire, section 132 became less and less relevant, until now
it is obsolete. Canada is left in the difficult position of being a full
international person, with the responsibilities that that entails, and
24. Supra, note 22, 348.
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yet there is no one government that has the power to ensure
compliance with international law, customary or conventional.
Provincial autonomy, which would, in my opinion, have been
protected by the doctrine of "colourable legislation", could have
survived a re-interpretation of either section 132 or the federal
general power under section 91 of the B.N.A. Act permitting the
federal authorities to legislate in provincial areas of competence in
fulfillment of an international commitment.
In the Offshore Minerals Reference, the Supreme Court of
Canada hinted that it might accept such an argument when it said, in
support of its opinion that the Dominion owned the mineral rights in
the continental shelf, that "it is Canada, not the Province of British
Columbia, that will have to answer the claims of other members of
the international community for breach of the obligations and
responsibilities imposed by the Convention". 2 5 The Supreme Court
has here demonstrated an awareness of the inadequacy of the
present situation regarding the implementation of treaties, but it
may take many more years before a proper case comes before it and,
even then, the court may not overrule the previous decisions. The
faster and surer way to change this situation is to take advantage of
current efforts to revise the constitution and to introduce a
modernized version of section 132. The federal government might
have to pay for such a revision but in the long run the price would be
cheap.
We have seen thus far that the rule in Canada and in England is
similar: most treaties require implementing legislation in order to
change domestic law. When we examined this rule in the English
context, we found that it was justified by the theory of the
separation of powers between Crown and Parliament. The same
theory applies in Canada: it is an important principle of Canadian
constitutional law that the executive not be permitted to escape
parliamentary control by doing by treaty what it could not otherwise
do alone. Thus, in Canada, a treaty may be signed and ratified and
yet have no effect internally as a result of either or both of two
obstacles: either Parliament does not implement it or Parliament can
not implement it. The treaty, to the extent that it was intended to
operate internally, and many significant treaties of modern times are
so intended, is rendered meaningless.
25. Re Offshore Mineral Rights of British Columbia, [1967] S.C.R. 792, 821. A
strong supporting argument could have been based on the federal general power.
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With due respect to the fundamental principles of separation and
distribution of powers, may we not ask if such an approach to
international citizenship is permissible? For example, after playing
a role in the drafting of the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination of 1965, Canada
waited until October 14th, 1970 before ratifying this treaty.2 6 There
has been no implementing legislation.
The Canadian Bill of Rights which was assented to on August
10th, 1960 guarantees many of the freedoms called for in the
convention, but it has two basic weaknesses. First, it is a federal
statute and applies only in areas of federal competence. While this
does include criminal matters, for the most part it fails to cover the
provincial areas of civil and property rights. Second, until rather
recently, the Bill of Rights was not being accorded much weight in
Canadian courts. In a number of apparently relevant situations, it
was found inapplicable. The recent case of R. v. Drybones presents
a notable exception to this trend and may signal a change in judicial
27
thinking.
The federal government, when questioned about the implementation of the civil and property rights portion of the convention,
indicated that it thought the provinces now provide a standard of
civil rights sufficiently high to meet those of the convention.
Several comments might be made at this point. Even if it is so now,
will the provinces maintain those standards? If an individual is
subjected to some form of discrimination and goes before a court,
will it help his case to cite this convention to the court, or to point
out that Canada has ratified the treaty? Will it help him to inform the
court that the federal government believes that civil rights in the
provinces are protected at least to the extent required by the
28
convention? Surely, as the law is to-day, the answer is no.
26. See "Canadian Practice in International Law during 1970 as Reflected Mainly
in Public Correspondence and Statements of the Department of External Affairs"
in (1971), 9 Can. Y.B. Int'l. L. 300.

27. Regina v.Drybones (1970), 9 D.L.R, (3d)473 (S.C.C.).
28. It is interesting to note the brief history of such attempts in our judical annuals.
In a series of prisoner-of-war cases, notably R. v. Brosig, [1945] 2 D.L.R. 232
(Ont. C.A.), the courts appeared to hold that the Geneva Convention of 1929,
although not implemented by legislation, was part of our law. There are, however,
other explanations of these cases. There were two restrictive covenant cases which
went both ways on the question of the force of the unimplemented San Francisco
Charter and the Atlantic Charter: Re Drummond Wren, [1945] O.R. 778 (Ont.
H.C.) and Re Noble and Wolf, [1948] O.R. 579 (Ont. H.C.). In reversing the
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If we are to give some special status to the convention, what
might this status be? It is clear that we cannot simply permit the
executive to bypass Parliament; nor does there appear to be a simple
solution to the federal-provincial difficulty. In regard to the
separation of powers, these could be adequately protected and, at
the same time, recognition could be given to a solemn binding
commitment of the federal executive, as an expression of official
public policy, by granting ratified treaties a status higher than the
common law but lower than statute law. In other words, a ratified
treaty would be the law of Canada until and unless it conflicted with
a statute passed by Parliament. Since, subject to some important
exceptions to be discussed presently, treaties are submitted to
Parliament for approval, the federal Parliament would be most
certainly aware of these new laws and could, if it disapproved, pass
a statute to overrule it. The check on the Executive would be
maintained. But, unless there existed or was enacted such a statute,
the treaty would be law. This might also provide a solution to the
separation of powers difficulty since the provincial Parliaments
would have an opportunity to scrutinize the treaty and pass
corrective legislation if they saw fit.
Another approach might be to provide that all treaties must be
ratified by Parliament and then give them the force of law. This
procedure might produce practical difficulties in that there is, as we
shall see, some question about what is and what is not a treaty. The
federal government has been, in recent years, signing agreements
which it considers to be less than the type of treaty that customarily
goes before Parliament for approval. Of course, this difficulty is
overcome by the provision that, unless the treaty is ratified by
Parliament, it has no legal effect except that which is already within
the power of the executive. This approach also would avoid the
separation of powers difficulty in that, if the subject matter of the
treaty were provincial, the provincial legislatures would have to
ratify it also. One can see immediately that there would be
difficulties in this latter respect since one province might refuse to
ratify. A better solution would probably be to allow the federal
Parliament's ratification to implement the treaty and deal with the
federal-provincial aspect in some other way.
Ontario courts the Supreme Court of Canada (Noble and Wolf v. Alley et al, [1951]
1 D.L.R. 321) did not mention either of the international instruments despite the
fact that they were discussed at length by the lower courts.
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The simplest solution, at least on the surface, to the division of
powers question would be a reference to the Supreme Court on the
treaty question. It has been suggested, here and elsewhere, that the
Supreme Court might well be ready to overrule or refuse to follow
the LabourConventions Case. There are two difficulties here. First,
the Supreme Court might decide against the federal government;
and, second, even if the federal government was successful, it
might not be politically feasible to take advantage of the victory.
Such was the case with the Offshore MineralsReference. 2 9 A better
approach must be, as suggested earlier, to negotiate a modernization
of section 132 with appropriate safeguards. Since the separation of
powers problem will require a constitutional change in any case, it
would be appropriate to consider-all aspects of this issue at once.
We have seen that, in a sense, Canada is restricted as an
international person in regard to treaties. The possible solutions to
this problem, and only a few have been discussed, will probably be
long in coming and, in the meantime, the federal and to a lesser
extent the provincial governments have been working out methods
of dealing internationally which avoid some of the more serious
repercussions. These methods are best examined by studying
Canadian practice, as opposed to theory, in dealing with
international obligations.
II.

ConventionalLaw And Municipal Law: The Practice

The word treaty, as is well-known, is frequently used to describe a
variety of binding international arrangements of differing degrees of
formality and importance of subject matter, all of which come
within the category of conventional international law. These include
treaties themselves, conventions, protocols, agreements, declarations, final acts, and exchanges of notes. There arrangements may
be contracted between heads of states, foreign ministers, and heads
of administrative departments. Ratification and evidence that the
contractor has full powers may or may not be required. Parliament
may implement, ratify or approve them; or, they may not be put
before Parliament at all. It is only in the light of these various
possibilities that one can properly appreciate the difficulties and
dangers of attempting to state anything like a rule, custom or even
trend in the area of Canadian practice.
29. This is not to deny that a favourable judgment allows Ottawa to bargain from
strength, an important consideration in the federal government's overall strategy.
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A. E. Gotlieb has examined discrete periods of Canada's
treaty-making history since the Second World War, including the
period 1965-1970, and concluded that, except for bilateral treaties
with the United States, Canada has shown a tendency towards
greater formality in its treaty-making in recent years. As he says,
"it may be observed in the declining use of exchanges-of-notes in
the bilateral field; in the emergence of a higher percentage of
bilateral treaties subject to ratification than in late pre-World War II
years, and in an upswing in formal multilateral treaty-making." 30
He goes on to note that, although multilateral treaties are increasing
in frequency, bilateral treaties with the United States, by far our
most common treaty, have been for some time and continue to be
informal. The exact nature of these informalities will be discussed
later. It is difficult to draw any conclusions from Gotlieb's
observations except to note that Canada appears to treat
commitments with partners other than the United States with more
caution.
There are few statutory provisions relating to the exercise of the
treaty-making power in Canada, it being, for the most part governed
by constitutional custom. The power itself is part of the royal
prerogative which is, in Canada, exercised by the Governor General
in Council. There is no obligation at law, therefore, to submit
treaties, either before or after their signature to Parliament for its
approval or otherwise. Rafification, in its strict international sense,
refers to the competent constitutional organ of a state giving its
definitive consent to be bound by the treaty. It is part of the
treaty-making power and in Canada it too is exercised under the
prerogative by the executive. There is, however, tradition in
Canada, dating back at least to the 1920's, of submitting treaties for
Parliamentary approval before ratification. Of course, this policy
relates only to those treaties which do no require Parliamentary
action to implement them. Those treaties requiring implementing
legislation are approved when such legislation is passed or they
have no effect.
On June 21, 1926, Mr. Mackenzie King, then Prime Minister,
introduced a resolution approving the recommendations of the 1923
Imperial Conference regarding treaty making. This resolution said
in part that "This House... considers... that before His Majesty's
30. A. E. Gotlieb, Canadian Treaty-Making: Informal Agreements and InterDepartmental Arrangements (1968), p. 13.
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Canadian Minister advises ratification of a treaty or convention
affecting Canada, or signifies acceptance of any treaty, convention or
agreement involving military or economic sanctions, the approval
of the Parliament of Canada should be secured. 3 ' Ad- m"c.nad, in
earlier speeches, indicated tnat tnis policy would apply to
"Important treaties' and "obligations involving any considerable
financial outlays or active undertakings" as well as those involving
"political considerations of a far-reaching character." 3 2 This
approach was extended in 1941 when Mr. King said: "The practice
is that, except in the case of very unimportant agreements or in the
case of great urgency, the Senate and House of Commons are asked
to approve formal treaties, conventions and agreements, before they
are ratified. . .,,3 In recent years, however, there has been a
backing off from this position and it may now be said that only in
cases of very important treaties is Parliamentary approval sought.
The renewal of the NORAD agreement, the ratification of the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and the
ratification of the extradition treaties with Austria and Israel are all
instances where no approval was sought and yet they would appear
to come within even the early guidelines set down by Mr. King.
In addition, distinctions are being drawn between "treaties" and
"agreements", Mr. King's guidelines being considered as referring
to the former only. On September 30, 1963, after it had become
apparent that the agreement between Canada and the United States
to permit the deployment of nuclear warheads on Canadian territory
would not be placed before Parliament, Mr. T. C. Douglas asked
Prime Minister Pearson if and when Parliament would be permitted
to scrutinize the agreement. Mr. Pearson replied that it would not
ever be presented with that opportunity , justifying his position by
saying that "the agreement to which my friend refers is not a treary
or a heads of state agreement which would require ratification and
customary prior approval of the House of Commons. It is an
executive agreement, an exchange of notes between
governments. " 3 4 A motion to table the agreement was defeated by a
vote of 105-91.35
31. "Canadian Practice in International Law during 1969 as Reflected Mainly in
Public Correspondence of the Department of External Affairs", in (1970), 8 Can.
Y.B. Int'l L. 367.
32. Ibid.
33. Ibid.
34. H. C. Deb (Can.), 1963, vol. IV, 3028-29.
35. Ibid., 3118-19.
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In 1966, the Minister of Industry, Mr. Drury, moved a resolution
to approve the agreement on automotive products signed in Johnson
City, Texas, on January 16, 1965 and implemented by Orders-inthnt day. When questioned by the Opposition about the
LOuD%.!1
fifteen-month delay and the implementation before approval, Mr.
Drury replied that, if this were a treaty, it would clearly come within
Mr. King's guidelines: "But in this case this is not a treaty. It is an
agreement between the administrations of two countries governing
the exercise of their normal administrative functions. ' 'a 6 Other
examples include the voluntary restraints on trade negotiated with
Japan in 1964, the memorandum of the understanding reached
between the governments of Canada and Hong Kong on restrictions
of certain cotton textile exports to Canada in 1965, and the limits
agreed to with the Government of Communist China regarding
certain sensitive items as part of a wheat sale contract.
It can be seen then that as Canada's treaty-making becomes more
sophisticated, there is a tendency away from Parliamentary
scrutiny. Even where Parliament is called upon to approve a treaty,
the terms of the treaty are not open for debate, only whether or not is
should be ratified. In 1964, the Columbia River Treaty was before
Parliament for approval and the New Democratic Party wished to
amend the approving resolution to make it subject to Canada's
negotiating a new protocol to the treaty clarifying certain clauses.
The Speaker ruled this amendment out of order on the ground that,
in putting the treaty before Parliament for approval, the government
was not ipso facto relinquishing its prerogative in the realm of
7
treaty-making. His ruling was upheld by a vote of the House.a
It is, however, the practice of the Secretary of State for External
Affairs to table, in both the House and the Senate, the texts of
almost all international agreements which would not otherwise
come to the attention of Parliament . There is also a list, deposited
periodically in Parliament by the Prime Minister, of all Orders-inCouncil, including those authorizing the conclusion of international
agreements. Finally, there are the annual reports of the Department
of External Affairs, the Department's bi-monthly bulletin, International Perspectives, and the Canada Treaty Series.
It is significant that even those treaties which are given the
severest scrutiny - those for the ratification of which approval is
36. H. C. Deb (Can.), 1966, vol. V,4815-16.
37. H. C. Deb (Can.), 1964, 3954.
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sought - are not exposed to the possibility of amendment. And the
others, that ever-growing category of "unimportant treaty" and
"other than treaty", are simply published after the fact in a manner
in which only those Members of Parliament with the greatest
interest or time would have a chance to read let alone study them.
Of course, even if they did study them, there would be no
opportunity to discuss the matter in Parliament without the use of
skillful tactics.
Reviewing momentarily what we have seen thus far in Canadian
treaty practice, we find that the signing and ratifying of a treaty is
within the power of the Executive. It is the Executive which decides
upon the form and content of the treaty. If the treaty requires
implementing legislation according to the Arrow River doctrine, the
Executive will normally, before signing or, at least before ratifying,
the treaty, place the implementing legislation before Parliament and
a full opportunity to debate the treaty will be afforded. If, however,
implementing legislation is unnecessary, there is no legal
requirement for the Executive even to inform Parliament of what it
is doing. The individual Members might, some time after the fact,
glean from records and long lists of Orders-in-Council that
something had happened - if their constituents had not notified
them already - but even then there would be no simple way to
bring the matter before the House, save by using the intricate
medium of the question period or by attaching it to other bills such
as Motions for Supply.
Recognizing the limitations of this system, Prime Minister King
said in 1923 that "the day has passed when any government or
executive should feel that they should take it upon themselves
without the approval of Parliament to commit a country to
obligations....38 Were this the start of a binding custom, there
could be no cause for concern at the lack of formal constitutional
requirements. But, as we have seen, the custom, if it ever was one,
is falling into disuse. In addition, it has been decided that
Parliament has only a minimal role in these resolutions of approval,
although full debate is allowed.
Surely the day Mr. King was speaking of has passed. Can it be
acceptable in Canada today to have a treaty as important as the
Automotive Products Agreeement, with its important tariff changes,
its far reaching economic impact, and its significant political
38. Supra, note 31, above.
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implications, put into effect almost secretly? It is true that this was
done legally, for these changes were made under powers that had
been delegated to the Executive by Parliament; at a time when such
an Agreement was not even contemplated. And, of course, it is true
that the agreement received a certain amount of publicity when it
was signed. But these considerations cannot make up for the fact
that the tariff changes were in effect for fifteen months before
Parliament was given an opportunity to approve or disapprove
them, there never being an opportunity to change them. Can this be
justified by saying that the changes in Canadian law were made
pursuant to an "agreement" and not a "treaty"?
If there were a constitutional requirement, either in written or
unwritten form, that all treaties, using the word in its broadest
meaning, of any significance, be it economic, military or political,
be placed before parliament for its approval before ratification; or, if
no ratification were required, before signing it into force, most of
the dangers, real and apparent, in the present system would be
eliminated. Parliament would see the terms of the treaty as a body
before Canada was bound to it and, since the terms of the treaty
would themselves be up for approval, amendments could be
proposed. The prospect of Parliament sending back approvals
conditioned upon the negotiation of certain new terms may appear
horrifying to the professional in foreign affairs, but we must have
faith in Parliament's ablility to grasp the difficulties which such a
procedure would create. Obviously, in the case of multi-lateral
agreements, it would have to be a take it or leave it approach.
Such a custom would also make more acceptable my earlier
proposal about the status of a signed and ratified. treaty. The
suggestion was that such treaties, though lacking implementing
legislation, should be considered as the law of the land until and
unless contradicted by statutes of Parliament which would, of
course, take precedence. There was a danger implicit in this
suggestion that Parliament would not even know about these new
"laws" until they were in force and, even then, would not hear of
them as a body, but rather as individuals. It might be too difficult
for opponents of the new treaty to organize a bill to change it.
Under my proposed approval system, any treaty which would
affect our domestic law or make any economic, military or political
commitments for Canada, whether or not implementing legislation
was required, would be placed before Parliament in the form of a
resolution approving its terms before Canada bound herself to it.
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Once the approving resolution was passed and Canada had bound
herself internationally, the terms of the treaty would be Canadian
law, having a status above the common law but below statute law. If
implementing legislation were thought necessary, either for the sake
of clarity or to override existing statutes, parliament could then pass
it. If none were required, the executive could issue the requisite
Orders-in-Council, if they were necessary, with the assurance that
Parliament had already approved their actions.
At the same time, it would be helpful, to say the least, if the
meaning of the term "treaty" could be cleared up. At present, there
are many international commitments created between Canada and
other countries, the United States in particular, which take the form
of exchanges of notes between the heads of administrative
departments or even simple exchanges of letters. These come to the
attention of Parliament, if at all, only in the most indirect and
off-hand manner. The theory behind these forms of agreements is
that nothing is being agreed to that is not within the power of the
administrator to do on his own already. That is, he is aquiring no
new powers by virtue of the treaty and any changes he makes are
pursuant to powers already delegated to him by some act of
Parliament. Since he is acting for the Executive, he is in the same
position as the Executive vis-a-vis not having to account to
Parliament for its actions within its prerogative.
Several points come to mind. First, administrators no not have
any prerogatives; they have, if Parliamnet has granted them, certain
powers to make regulations through Orders-in-Council within
pre-determined guidelines. Second, when Parliament delegates this
authority, it has, generally speaking, few expectations that this
authority is going to be used to commit Canada as a nation to
international obligations. Third, the terms of these arrangements
become obligations and those in Canada who are charged with
administering various Acts of Parliament have their discretion
fettered to the extent these obligations impinge upon their subject
area. Finally, these are international commitments with invariably
widespread political consequences; consequences which may
exceed the apparently minor nature of the subject matter;
consequences which Parliament should have an opportunity to
consider beforehand.
The procedures for obtaining Parliamentary approval suggested
above, then, should be applied to all treaties including any type of
arrangement by which Canada becomes bound, whether legally or
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morally, to do certain things. This will assure that the people in
Canada who will be affected by these obligations will through their
representatives be given an opportunity to scrutinize them in
advance.
The Canadian practice with regard to the distribution of
legislative powers problem is interesting as well. A. E.Gotlieb in
his Canadian Treaty-Making argues that the federal government
has, through an informal and pragmatic approach, developed
effective and simplified means for making treaties despite the
apparent restrictions of the Labour Conventions doctrine. 3 9 In
support of this argument he notes that many of the treaties Canada
enters into require no implementing legislation. Of those treaties
which do require implementing legislation, many lie within the
federal sphere of compentence. Treaties which have as their subject
matter defence, trade, fishing, high seas and taxation make up some
85% of the formal treaties entered into by Canada and these all lie
within federal competence.
Some treaties do require provincial legislation to implement them
however and for these Canada has two choices. It can insist on the
inclusion within the treaty of a so-called "federal state" clause by
which Canada ratifies only such parts of the treaty as lie within the
federal power and ratifies the other parts when and if the provinces
pass the necessary legislation. This method has several obvious
drawbacks, the most obvious being that Canada's treaty partners
may be, and frequently are, unwilling to permit Canada to enjoy this
special position. In addition, Canada's actual fulfillment of her
international obligations becomes a rather amorphous quantity.
A more practical solution and one which Canada adopted after the
legislation implimenting the three I.L.O. Conventions was
disallowed, is to have consultations between the various levels of
government respecting the legislation or administrative changes
required to implement a given treaty. The substantial success
achieved by Canada in implementing these labour treaties is
chronicled by E. A. Laundry. 40 There have been, since that time, a
number of I.L.O. conventions and the constitution of the I.L.O.
requires that a member state brings a convention "before the
authority or authorities within whose competence the matter lies for
39. Gotlieb, supra, note 30, p. 20.
40. E. A. Landy, The Effectiveness of International Supervision:
Thirty Years of J.L.O. Experience, (1966), 111-112.
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the enactment of legislation or other action". In 1964, the Minister
of Labour, speaking of a convention respecting discrimination in
employment said: The Prime Minister (Mr. Pearson) wrote to each
provincial premier to ask for confirmation that the province is
pursuing. . .a policy or promotion of equality of
opportunity. . . within the spirit of the convention. . .The
response. . .was positive. 4 1 Canada did not employ the "federal
state" clause method when it signed the International Convention
on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination. Instead a
series of communications and consultations were commenced which
were reported in a communication from the Department of External
Affairs relying to an inquiry about the status of the convention. "In
this connection the Government is now entering a process of
consultation with the provinces concerning those provisions of the
convention which fall within provincial jurisdiction. The federal
government, at the present time, is actively engaged in consulting
the provinces about the possibility of Canada's ratifying several
42
conventions which touch upon human rights.
As we saw earlier, this convention was ratified on October 14,
1970 and, since no legislation was passed in pursuance of the
convention by most of the provinces, we are left to infer that these
consultations yielded the response that the provinces were already
meeting that standard. This is, in fact, the position of the
Department of External Affairs and the difficulties inherent in this
approach have been discussed earlier. These observations, which
are applicable to the consultation approach generally, reduce to the
following question: so long as implementing legislation is necessary
to supplant the common law by a treaty provision, are letters written
to provincial premiers eliciting general replies fully satisfactory?
There are, of course, several substantial responses to the
foregoing observations. It might well be suggested that even if
Canada has no adequate method of fulfilling its obligations, it is still
worthwhile signing these documents if only to lend what moral
support we can to the principles contained in them. The argument
would run that few countries do, initially, fulfil these conventions,
which are designed to protect individuals within their own country,
but that if we can at least get them to sign a document purporting to
41. H. C. Deb (Can.) 1964, 8993-94.
42. "Canadian Practice in International Law during 1966 as Reflected Mainly in
Correspondence and Statements of the Department of External Affairs" in (1967),
5 Can. Y.B. Int'lL. 275-76.
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set these protections as goals, the reality might gradually move
towards the form.
The second response might be that while yes it probably is
unsatisfactory to be committing onself to obligations one cannot
property fulfil, nevertheless if we did not do it this way, we could
not sign any treaties at all. In the absence of substantial
constitutional change (and it would have to be substantial since the
types of treaties we are talking about concern basic civil rights and
property rights issues) the only alternative would be massive prior
consultations, provincial representation at the negotiations, and
provincial legislation passed and waiting to go into force before
Canada could sign an agreement. This alternative appears so
difficult that to articulate it is to reject it. We are, therefore, better
off muddling through as we are than doing nothing.
In response to the first answer, that these treaties are useful even
if only as ideals, I would have to agree. If it became clear that
Canada's abilities to fulfil its obligations could in no way be
strengthened, then it probably is better to sign anyway for moral
support and in the hopes of gradual improvement. But, our moral
support must be backed up by our ability to "deliver" within our
own territory. As to the second argument, that muddling through is
better than not moving, I can only partially agree. While this
approach is, admittedly, in our Anglo-Canadian tradition and is
even a source of pride among one school of political scientists, it
does tend to avoid for a scandalous length of time fundamental
questions and difficulties. It is not an answer to say that by a very
pragmatic approach we are managing to get some things done. The
true question ought to be: what could we do if the system were more
finely tuned? It is by the standards set by the answer to that question
that we must measure our present system.
Sooner or later we will have to face the reality that Canada, as a
member, and more so, as one of the leaders, of the world
community must have the power to change domestic law even in the
sacred provincial rights areas popularly referred to as the
sociological issues. Sooner rather than later. These changes can be
wrought by a re-interpretation of our present constitution or, better,
by a modernization of section 132 of the B.N.A. Act with
appropriate safeguards against "colourable" interference.
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III. Conclusion
In the area of international treaty law Canada has serious problems
which affect us both domestically and internationally. There is the
question of the status of a treaty duly signed and ratified but not
implemented, the treaty which is not brought before Parliament, and
the treaty which the federal government cannot implement even if it
wanted to. None of these problems admits of any easy solution. The
tentative suggestions put forward - the special status for an
unimplemented but signed treaty, the requirement for Parliamentary
approval,and the amending of our constitution - are all of them
major changes. They may well carry with them the seeds of even
greater difficulties. But they, along with other even more sweeping
possibilities, such as a role for a provincially oriented Senate of
Canada in treaty-ratifying or provincial treaty-making outside of the
present "Umbrella Treaty" method now employed, must be
4
considered if we are to begin to resolve these difficult questions. A
43. For a consideration of the related problem on customary international law, see
R. St. J. Macdonald, The Relationship between International Law and Domestic
Law in Canada in Macdonald, Morris and Johnston, Canadian Perspectives and
International Law and Organization, 1974, pp. 88-137.

